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I. INTRODUCTION 
AN ALGEBRAIC PROOF OF THE 
COMPLETENESS OF SENTENTIAL LOGIC 
In this paper we prove the completeness of sentential logic 
using concepts of Boolean structures. For readers unfamiliar 
with the terminology, "sentential" or elementary" logic (sometimes 
called the Statement Calculus) is the usual form of valid reasoning, 
omitting quantification over variables. For example, statements 
such as "P or Q" and "if P then not Q and not R" represent such 
forms. Statements including quantification, such as "if for all 
x, P(x), then for some y, Q(y)" do not fall into the category 
discussed here; they belong to the so-called first-order logic. 
The restriction to elementary logic is reasonable since the proof 
of completeness in the first order case parallels the proof presented 
here, though it is technically much more difficult. 
The study of elementary logic is primarily concerned with 
discovering the forms of valid reasoning. As an example, let A 
be the statement "If P then P or Q" where P and Q are arbitrary 
assertions. The distinctive feature of statement A is that it 
2 
is regarded as true independent of the truth or falsity of 
assertions P and Q, the more basic statements from which is is 
composed. It is these statements which are true simply on the 
basis of their form not their content which represent the.subject 
matter of sentential logic. The "completeness" of this logic 
asserts that if a statement is of such a (tautologous) form then 
it can be proved. Now, as soon as the concept of proof is mentioned, 
we begin to ask about axioms, rules of inference, theorems, etc. 
But first let us establish some ground rules for the formal 
language. 
II. THE STATEHENT CALCULUS 
In order, to formalize the discussion of statements such as 
those mentioned in § I, it is necessary to introduce a symbolic 
language L in which these statements can be expressed. 
The primitive symbols of L are the following: 
1. Propositional Variables: a countable set, P = (p1 ,p2 , ... }. 
2. Connectives: (no commas) 
3. Parentheses: 
' 
) 
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P is' our set of basic statement symbols with which other 
statements are built. 11 --7" is interpreted as "if .•• 
then . . . , " and 11 1 " is the negation symbol. The correct way 
to build sentences are these: 
1. Any propositional variable is a well-formed formula (wff) 
2. If A and B are wffs, then /A is a wff, and 
(A~ B) is a wff. 
Let W be the set of all wffs. As examples, 1 (P1 ..----!) P2 ) 
E W, and P1P2 I W (more than one variable but no connective). 
The element of W referred to above can be interpreted as "not, 
if P1 then P2 ." The utility of the formal language L in our 
discussion is obvious. Let us now make rigorous the above assign-
ment of meaning to the statements of L. 
Def. 1 An interpretation is a map g: P ·-? (T ,F). 
Let I be the set of all interpretations. An interpretation 
then is an assignment of meaning (but only truth or falsity) to 
each basic statement of our language. A value map extends these 
assignments to each wff in W. 
Def, 2 A value map based on the interpretation g is a map 
v · W --7 (T,F} defined indictively as follows: g' 
V (p.) = g(p.) for all p, E P. g ~ ~ • 
If A is 1 B for some B E W, then 
V (A) = F g • ff v ( ) • g B = T 
If A is (B ---7 C) for some B, C E 1'1, then 
and v (c) = F. g 
Using the above, the value map of an interpretation g can 
be computed for any wff. in W, 
Def. 3 If A E W, and g E I, then 
A is true in g_ if 
A is false in g_ if 
V (A) = T; g . 
V (A) =F. g 
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Def. 4 A E W is a tautology if it is true in all interpretations. 
(Denoted by I= A) • 
Def. 5 If A E W, then g e I is a model of A iff V (A) = T. g 
One can see that a statement A is a tautology if and only 
if every interpretation g is a model of A. In other words A 
is "true" regardless of whether any of the basic statements P1P2 , 
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etc., are true or false. Thus, tautologies are of primary 
interest; they represent those special forms involved with valid 
reasoning mentioned in I. 
Since the completeness theorem concerns the relationship 
between tautologies and what is "provable," we need a precise 
notion of what a "proof" is.· we begin by presenting certain 
axioms and rules of inference which will be used in our definition 
of a proof. 
The following are statements of 'il which we take as 
axioms: 
1. (A-7 (B~A)) 
2. ((A-" (B----tC))----0 ((A-7BJ·-7 (A~C))) 
3. ((IA-7 1B)----7 (B--7A)) 
4. (A--) A) 
5. (iiA--'?A) 
6. (A~IlA) 
Note that all of these axioms are tautologies. Some of them 
are familiar. For instance, 3) is a statement of the contra-
positive law. It should be noted that these formulas technically 
are not elements of W in themselves; they are axiom schema. To 
obtain an axiom, simply substitute a wff for A,B, and C in 
1) - 6). As abbreviations we will write 
(A V B) 
(A /\ B) 
(A~ B) 
for 
for 
for 
(-r A --:;:, B ) 
I (A--7 -,B) 
((A~ B) 1\ (B ----'7 A)) 
Their meanings can be derived· from that of ·1 and --;:. ·and are 
described as follows: 
(A v B)' is true if either A or B is true, or both 
(AI\ B) is true if both A and B are true 
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(A 0 B) is true if A and B are either both true, or both false. 
The rules of inference which allow us to proceed from axioms to 
other "theorems" are as follows: 
For any A,B,C 
€ w' 
From: Infer: 
1. A,B (A A B) 
2; (A 1\ B) (B 1\ A) 
3. (AV B) (B VA) 
4. (A v (B V C)) ( (A\;' B) V C ) 
5. (A 1\ (B I\ C)) ((A 1\-B) !\C) 
6. .A. (A VB) 
7. (AM B) ' (B V C) ( (A v C) <---7> (B v c)) 
8. (A H B)' (B 1\ C) ((A 1\C) ~ (B (\C)) 
9. (A V A) A 
10. (A 1\ A) A 
I' 
,· 
From: Infer: 
11. (A -----') B ) ((A 1\ C) -7 B) 
12. (A ------'/ B ) ' (A~ (B V C)) 
13. (A 1\ B) A 
14. A, (A-7 B) B 
The most important property of a rule of inference i's that 
it preserve tautologousness; the reader can .check that the above 
rules satisfy this requirement. This list of rules of inference 
may seem lengthy. However, .all the above rules can in fact be 
derived from the last rule, commonly known as modus ponens (in 
Latin, "method of affirming"). For example, we can derive 
(informally) rule No. 3): 
1. (A V B) 
2. (IA---JB) 
3. ((lA ------'7 IIB)----?(IB----}A)) 
an assumption 
translation.of 1. 
contrapositive axiom 
axiom 6) 4. (B ~liB) 
5. ( I A -')>II B) 
6. (/B-4-A) 
7. (B V A) 
2. and 4. 
3., 5., and modus ponens 
translation of 6. 
We now formalize the above proof process and define what is 
meant by a proof, a proof from assumptions and a theorem. 
Def. 6 
o<l' ••• ' o< k 
. . ' W € W is a proof seguence from assumptions n 
iff each wi' 1 L.. i b n, is 
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1. an axiom, or 
2. An assumption from (a<1 , •• ,c<k), or 
3. inf.erred from w1 , ..• , w i _1 by a rule of inference. 
Def. 7 If A is the last wff in a proof sequence from 
assumptions, we say A is provable from these assumptions. 
(Denoted ( o< 1 , ••• , o( k) f- A, or 0: J- A, if c( = ( c{ 1 , ••• , o( k) • 
Def. 8 An absolute proof seguence is a proof sequence with an 
empty assumption set. 
Def. 9 A € W is a theorem if it is provable from the empty 
set of assumptions. (Denoted 1- A) • 
The relation between the two forms of proof can be formalized 
into a powerful tool which we· simply state without proof as the 
Deduction Theorem (A) f- B iff 1- {A ~B) • 
This theorem formalizes the often used method of assuming 
as axioms the hypothesis of a theorem, and then proving the 
conclusion. One hasn't really proved the conclusion; he has 
proved "if the hypothesis is true, then so is the conclusion." 
We shall need the following concept: 
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Def. 10 (l C W is deductively inconsistent iff 
C( f- .I (p1 ~ p 1 ) . Otherwise, {( is deductively consistent. 
In other words, C( is deductively inconsistent if, by 
assuming C( , one can prove something which is patently false. 
One can easily prove the following lemma which says that it does 
not matter exactly what patently false statement is provable from 
C(. 
Lemma 1 The following are equivalent: 
1. a_ is deductively inconsistent; 
2. for some A € w CCI- A and {t 1- I A; 
3. for all A € w C(_ 1- A and <:{ 1- I A. 
With the description of the formalization of elementary 
logic completed, we now know 'precisely what the objects are that 
are dealt with in the completeness theorem, which, informally, 
states that every tautology is a theorem. As the title of this 
paper suggests, we will use the concepts of Boolean structures in 
the proof. 
III. BOOLEAN STRUCTURES 
Def. 11 A Boolean ring is a ring with identity in which every 
element is idempotent, that is, for all b in the boolean ring, 
As an example, consider the two-element ring (0,1), with 
operations defined by: 
+ 0 1 . 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
. 
1 1 0 1 0 1 
This boolean ring is a field; it is the only boolean 
field and is in fact isomorphic to Z/2Z. 
As another example, let X be an arbitrary set. Then the 
z 
set 2X = (f:X4 1/zz) is a boolean ring, with the operations 
defined pointwise. 
This· all serves as an introduction to a more natural formu-
lation of these structures, the boolean algebra: 
DeL 12 A boolean algebra is a non-empty set B with two binary 
operations, A , v, and one unary operation, I. . . , and two dlstlnct 
unique elements 0 and 1, satisfying: 
1. pVO=p 
2.P!\P 1 =0 
3. Pl\q = q/\p 
4. p 1\ (qvrl = (p /\ q) V (p!\r) 
pl\l=p 
PVP 1 = 1 
pyq = qVp 
P v (ql\r ) = (Pv q)l\ (p v r ) 
for all p,q, and r .€ B. 
11 
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The following are well-known theorems about boolean 
algebras: 
s. Ol : l 1 1 : 0 
6. PI\ 0 : 0 pV l: l 
7. p" : p 
8. p 1\P : p p\/p: p 
9 • (p 1\ q) I : pI V q I (pvq) I :pi!\ ql 
10. p 1\ (q,l\r) : (p/lq) /\r p v ( q vr ) : (p v q) vr 
As an example, consider an arbitrary non-empty set X. 
Then the set of·all subsets of X is a boolean algebra, with 
distinguished elements ¢ and X, and with operations defined by 
P /1 Q : Pn Q (intersection) 
PV Q = PV Q (union) 
pi (complementation) 
Boolean algebras and boolean rings can be interdefined. 
For, if B = (B, +, ·) is a boolean ring, we can define 
pv q : P + q + pq 
p/\q:p q 
pi : l + p 
for p,q € B. B = <B, f\, V, ', 0, l) , then becomes a boolean 
algebra. Similarly, if B: (B,I\,V, 1 ,0,1) 
is a boolean algebra, we can define 
B= (B, +,-) 
p + q = (p f\ q I ) \' (p I (\ q) 
p. q = PI\ q 
is then a boolean ring. 
We shall take the informal approach of naming the boolean ring 
or algebra by its underlying set B. 
Def. 13 A boolean ideal in a boolean algebra B is a subset M 
of B such that 
1. 0 E M 
2. if p E M and q E M, then p V q e: M 
3. if p E M and q E B, then p/\ q € M. 
Boolean ideals have a close relationship to ring ideals. 
In fact, 
Theorem 1. M is a boolean ideal in the boolean al,gebra B 
iff M is a ring ideal in the boolean ring B. 
The proof of the above theorem is a simple consequence of 
the definitions. 
The concept of a filter will be needed also. 
Def. 14 A QO~lean filter in a boolean algebra B is a subset 
N of B s. t. 
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l.l_EN 
2. if p E N and q E N, then p 1\ q E N 
3. if p E N and ·q E B, then p V q E .N • 
Ideals and filters are dual concepts in that if M is a 
boolean ideal, then N = (PIP' E M} is a boolean filter. And 
if N is a boolean filter, then M = (PIP' E N} is a boolean ideal. 
Def. 15 An ideal is maximal .if it is a proper ideal that is not 
included in any other proper ideal. 
This general definition, which applies to all ideals in all 
rings, can now be applied to boolean algebras. Maximal boolean 
ideals have a simple characterization. 
Lemma 2 If M is a boolean ideal in a boolean algebra B, then 
M is maximal iff for all p E B, either p E M or p' € M, 
but not both. 
PROOF: Assume N is maximal, and that there exists an element 
p E B s.t. neither 
0 
p
0 
E N nor p 1 E M. 
0 
Define N by 
N - (p V q I q E " PVP - p } It is easily checked. that N 
- "'' 0 - 0 • 
is an ideal of B. Also, N is a proper subset of N, since 
q=OVqEN 1/qEN. Butp
0
EN,andp
0
fN. Therefore, N is 
not maximal, contradicting the hypothesis. 
If M contains p or p 1 .but not both for all p E B, 
then any ideal N containing M (properly) would contain some 
Thus p 1 EMC:N 
0 
and hence N would contain 
p 0 A p~ = 1. But, if any ideal contains 1, it is the entire 
boolean algebra. Therefore, M is maximal. QED 
The above lemma is quite plausible from a ring-theoretic 
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viewpoint. For an ideal M to be maximal in B, it is necessary 
and sufficient that B/M be a field. But the only boolean field is 
the two-element field, Z~z1 . Hence we would expect that 
every maximal ideal would "split" the elements of B right down 
the middle, so to speak. 
A useful lemma concerning maximal boolean ideals will 
now be proved. 
Lemma 3 If M is a maximal boolean ideal, then x V Y E M iff 
X E: M and y E: M. 
PROOF: The "{f" part, of course, follows directly from the 
definition. Assume x f M, and x v y E M. Then x' E M since 
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M is maximal, by Lemma 2. Therefore x' v (xvy) E M, and hence 
(x' v x) v y E M by associativity of v. But x' v x = 1, and 
thus 1 v y = 1 E M, yielding, a contradiction. Thus, x E M. 
Similarly, y E M. QED. 
The primary theorem about maximal ideals is called, 
cryptically, the Maximal Ideal Theorem. It assures us that 
maximal ideals exis·t under the proper circumstances. 
The Maximal Ideal Theorem If B is a boolean algebra, and I 
is a proper ideal in B, then there exists a maximal ideal M 
of B containing I. 
The proof of the maximal ideal theorem involves Zorn's 
Lemma, which, of course, is equivalent to the axiom of choice. 
We are now ready to begin the proof of the completeness 
of elementary logic. Up to this point we have dealt on two 
seemingly unrelated topics, formulization of elementary logic and 
basic properties of boolean structures. We are now ready to 
describe their connection. 
IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EQUIVALENCE RELATION ON W 
Let W be the set of all wffs of L, as in ~ 2. Define 
an equivalence relation on W by: 
A ;= B iff f-- (A~ B)· 
Theorem 2 is an equivalence relation. 
PROOF: We must establish reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. 
3) - is transitive. Assume 
l. f-- (A~B), 1- (B(-'?C) 
A _ B and B s C. 
by definition of = , 
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translation of , and rule 
13) 
2. (A} 1-- B deduction theorem 
3. (A} 1-- (B -7 C) nature of proof sequence 
4. (A} 1- c Modus ponens with 2. and 3. 
5. f- (A-J C) deduction theorem 
Similarly we have 1-- . (C -';> A) , from which we infer 1- (A~> c) 
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and thus A _ C. QED. 
Thus is an equivalence relation. We next form W, the 
set of equivalence classes of ~· Let the equivalence class of 
a wff A . be denoted by [A). We shall make W into a boolean 
algebra. 
V. THE BOOLEAN ALGEBRA W 
We first define the three operations and the two distinct 
elements 0 and 1 on W. We do this as follows in the 
natural way: 
[A) 1\ [B) = [{AI\ B)) 
[A) V [B) = [ {A V B) ) 
[A)' = [lA) 
0 = [I B) where 1- B 
1 = [ B ) where 1- B 
Of course, it.must be shown that A, V, 1 , 0, and 1 are 
all well-defined, and that the boolean algebra axioms are 
satisfied. \'le show that II is well-defined and leave the rest 
to the reader.· 
In order to verify that II is well-defined we assume 
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1. h (Al~ A2) definition of -
2. 1- (Bl~ B2) II II 
3. f-- (Al-'7 A2)' 1- (A2-7 Al) definition of ' rule 13) 
4. f-- (Bl-----')- B2)' f- (B2----'? Bl) II II 
5. f- ((All\ Bl)~ A2) rule 11) 
6. f-- ((Bli\Al)~ B2) rule 11) 
7. ((Al/\Bl)} f- A2 
' 
( (Bll\ Al)) 1- B2 .deduction theorem 
8. ((Al/\Bl)} 1- A2 
' 
( (All\ Bl) ) 1- B2 commutativity of 1\ 
9. ((All\ Bl)} f- (A2!1 B2) rule 1) 
10. f- ( (Al (\ Bl) --7 (A2/\ B2)) deduction theorem 
11. 1- ((A2/\B2)~ (Al/\Bl)) similarly 
12. f- ( (Al/\Bl) H (A2/\B2)) definition off---7 
13. (All\ Bl) 
-
(A2 ;\ B2 ) definition of -
QED 
Assuming now that the operations 1\, v, and ~are well defined, 
we still need to verify the boolean algebra axioms. We check 
two and leave the rest to the reader. 
Claim [A] v 0 = [A] 
PROOF: [A] v 0 =[A] v [IB] where j- B. 
but 
now: 
also: 
Thus 
but 
[A·] v [IB] =[(A v !B)] 
((AviB)} 1- (-rA-7/B) bydefinitionof v 
f- ( (I A-----')- I B) ----',> (B -7 A) ) axiom 3) 
( (A v 1 B) ) f- (B -7 A) modus ponens. 
f- B assumption 
then ( {A v I B)) !- A 
hence f- { (A v -, B ) ~ A) 
clearly,· f- (1\ ·--4 (A vI B)) 
Thus f- {AM (A v B) ) 
hence A.:,{AVIB) 
Therefore, [A] ~ [(A v B)] 
= (A] v [I B] 
= [A] v 0 
Claim (A J 1\ [A 1 J = 0 
by modus ponens 
by deduction theorem 
by rule 12) 
translation of 
by definition of -
QED 
PROOF : [A] /1 [A 1 ] = [A] t\ [ '"'I A J = [ (A !\ I A)] 
= [/(A --7 II A)] by definition of t\ 
= 0 since f- {A --1 :t 1 A) (axiom 6)) 
QED, 
VI . THE KEY LEMMA 
Recalling the development of elementary logic in II, the 
"proof theory" and the "model theory" were treated quite 
separately and were practically unrelated. Yet the completeness 
theorem deals with precisely this relationship. Hence, we would 
like a bridge between the two concepts, This bridge is the 
following lenwa, and it is the key step in the proof of 
completeness. 
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Lemma 4 If A E W is deductively consistent, then A has a 
model (i.e., there exists an interpretation g which makes A 
true) . 
PROOF: The proof of this Lemma involves several claims. 
Let A be a statement in W, and assume A is deductively 
consistent. Thus, there does not exist a statement B such 
that A f- B and A f-- "1 B • Let F = ( [ B ] E l'l I f-- (A ·-----7 B) ) . 
F is a subset of the boolean algebra W. It is not simply a 
subset however. 
Claim F is a boolean filter. 
PROOF: 1 E F, since 1 = [B) where 1- B. 
but iff-- B, then (A} 1-B, and 1- (A-.c7B) 
by the deduction theorem. Thus 1 = [B] E F. 
Assume next [B), [C) E F. Hence 
f-- (A -7 B) , 1- (A --'7 C) . 
or (A} 1- B , (A) 1- c by the deduction theorem 
thus (A) f- (B/\ C) by rule 1) 
therefore [ (BI\ C)] E F, and [B) f\ [C] E F. 
Assume finally [13] E F, and [C) E W . 
Therefore 1- (A~ B). 
And so 
thus 
also 
1- (A ----'7 (B v C)) by rule 12) 
[(B v C)] E F, hence [B) v [C) E F. 
0 IF, since A is deductively consistent. 
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Thus F is a proper boolean filter in W, Also, (A] € F, 
since /- (A-'{ A) (axiom 4). 
Recall now that "filter" is the dual concept to an ideal 
(III). We shall now define the dual ideal to F: Let 
I = ( (B) E W (B] 1 E F}. I is an ideal, by duality, It is a 
proper ideal, since 1 f I. From the Haximal Ideal Theorem, we 
know that there exists a maximal ideal in W containing I . 
Let M be such a maximal ideal. we nov; construct the model of 
A which is called for in the Lemma. 
Let g: P~ (T,F} be defined by g(pi) =Tiff [pi] j M. 
g is then an interpretation. But is g a model of A? The 
following claim gives a complete characterization of those state-
ments which are true in g. 
Claim The value map Vg' of g, satisfies the following: 
iff (B] f H. 
PROOF: We shall prove this inductively, from the definition of a 
value map. First, note that V (p.) = T g l iff 
[pi] ¢ 1-1. Assume now that B is I C for some C E W. Then 
V (B) = T g iff iff iff (C J € M iff 
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[I B] € M (by axiom 5) iff [B ] 1 € M (by definition of 1 ) iff 
[B] ¢ M (since M is maximal) . Finally assume B is (C -7 D) . 
Then v
9
(B) = F iff V (C) = T and V (D) = F iff [C] f. M and g g 
[D] € M iff [C]' € M and [D] € M (since. M is maximal). iff 
[iC] € M and [D] € M iff [IC] v [D] € M (by Lemma 3) iff 
[([C v D)] € M iff [(C-')D}] € M.(by definition of v) iff 
[B] € M. Thus v
9 
(b) = F iff [B] E 1'1. Or, v9 (B) = T iff 
[B] € M. QED. 
We are left with one unfinished step: to prove that g is 
a model of the statement A. 
Claim g is a model of A. 
PROOF: We know that [A] € F. Therefore, [A]' € I since F and 
I are dual. But then [A]' € M, since I C: M. Hence [A] /. M, 
since M is a proper maximal ideal. Therefore, V (A} = T, g by 
previous claim. Hence g is a model of A, by definition. QED. 
Hence for any deductively consistent statement A, we can 
exhibit a model. Or, in the contrapositive form: 
Lemma 5 If a statement A € W has no models, then it is 
23 
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deductively inconsistent. 
This lemma, as mentioned above, is the big link between 
proof theory and model theory, and it is the key, step in the proof 
of the completeness theorem, which can now be proved quite easily. 
VII. THE COMPLETENESS THEOREM 
The completeness theorem states that any tautology is 
provable; i.e., any statement which is true in all interpretations 
can actually be proved from the axioms and rules of inference 
described in 2. In our notation, this becomes The Completeness 
Theorem. If A E W and FA, then f- A. 
PROOF: Assume F A, that is, A is a tautology. 
Hence, A is true in every interpretation. 
Thus, 1 A is false in every interpretation 
or, I A has no models. 
Therefore, lA is deductively inconsistent (by Lemma 5) 
Hence (I A) j- 1 (p1 ~ p 1 ) by definition. 
Then f- ( 1 A -· -'7 1 (p1 --) p 1 ) ) by deduction theorem 
But f- ( ( l A -7l(P1-'t p 1 )) ·~ ( (p1 -"'? p1)~ A) is axiom 3) 
so !-"" ( (p1---:~ p 1 ) --j- A) by inodus ponens 
Also, 1-- (p1 -~ p 1 ) is axiom 4) 
Thus J- A by modus ponens. 
QED. 
25 
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GODEL'S PROOF OF THE INCOMPLETENESS 
OF 
AXIOMATIC NUMBER THEORY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The well known theorem discussed in this paper, Godel's 
Incompleteness Theorem, is a landmark in the Foundations of 
Hathematics and has meaning for mathematicians, logicians, and 
philosophers alike. It dramatically exposes the limitations of 
the axiomatic approach which Hilbert had hoped would be the mathe-
maticians 1 final apology. 
Although the meaning of several of the terms in our title 
may be unknown to some readers, we offer some introductory remarks 
explai~ing the subject without becoming too technical. Essentially 
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem says that there exist statements 
about natural numbers which are neither provable nor disprovable 
from the axioms of number theory. The use of the word "statement" 
requires some explanation of the language in which sentences 
about number theory are expressed. The concept of provability 
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is perhaps intuitively vague but can be formulated precisely. 
The axioms of number theory are the Familiar Peano's Postulates 
about which more will be said later. 
II. THE LANGUAGE 
The language which is used in Godel's proof for expressing 
sentences about natural numbexs is commonly called a first-order 
language. The primitive symbols (which are analagous to the 
alphabet of a conventional language) are listed and explained in 
Table I. There are a countably infinite set of variables and 
constants. The reader will notice that we have used "outfix" 
notation for the function symbols, writing +(x,y) instead of 
x+y. Also, other familiar logical connectives can be defined in 
terms of these. A & B is an abbreviation of 1 ( !Av IB), and 
A~ B an abreviation of IAvB, the former being logical con-
junction "A and B11 and the latter the conditional statement 
11 if A then B11 • 
These symbols can be combined in an infinite number of 
ways to form strings of symbols only some of which are meaningful. 
Symbol 
( 
) 
I 
v 
= 
3 
s 
+ 
e 
x. 
l 
, 
TABLE I 
The Primitive Symbols of the Language 
Explanation 
Left parenthesis 
Right parenthesis 
Negation symbol -, A (= 11 not A 11 ) 
Logical disjunction AvB (= "A or B11 ) 
Logical equality x = y (= 11 x equals y") 
Universal Quantifier VxA{x) (="for all x, A{x)") 
Existential Quantifier 3xA (x) (="there exist an x, 
such that A (x) 
Less than x£.y (= "x is less than y") 
3 
Successor function symbol Sx (= "the successor of x") 
Addition functi<?n symbol + (x,y) (="x plus y") 
Multiplication function symbol · (x,y) (= "x times y") 
Exponentiation function symbol e (x,y) (= "xY") 
Variable 
Constant standing for N.N.i 
comma 
There are a countable number of variables and constants. 
4 
. ' 
We shall now describe exactly which of these strings are "formulas." 
The terms of the language are the following 
l. x. Any variable 
J_ 
2. c. 
J_ 
Any constant 
3. sa Where a is any term 
4. + (a,b) a,b are terms 
. 5. • (a,b) a,b are terms 
6. e (a, b) a,b .are terms 
The Atomic Formulas of the language are the following: 
l. (t = s) Where t, s are any terms 
2. (t L s) Where t,s are any terms 
For example, (+ (c2 ,c 3 ) <:::. sc8 ) is an atomic formula. (It expresses 
the statement 2 + 3 L:_ successor of 8). The class of formulas 
of the language can now finally be described: 
l. All atomic formulas are formulas. 
2. lA is a formula if A is a formula 
3. (A v B) is a formula if A,B are formulas 
4. (\fx.)A and (::jxi)A are J_ formulas if A is a formula 
x. 
J_ 
and if A does not already contain the symbols 
3 x. 
J_ 
containing 
'r/ x. or 
J_ 
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It expresses the statement "x1 = 5 or 1 + 3 <. 
X II 1 . As another 
an x s.t. x + 5 = 7. We may often omit the outermost parentheses 
of a formula when no confusion is possible. 
This language, though somewhat limited, is quite powerful 
in that with it one can express most of the common properties of 
the natural numbers. For instance, the statement that addition 
There are statements, however, which one cannot express in this 
language; for instance, "the set of even natural numbers is 
infinite" cannot be (try it!) ·The reader may be interested in 
discovering other "unexpressible" statements.· 
II. GODEL NU!vJBERING 
Kurt Godel in the mid-1930's invented a clever method of 
assigning natural numbers to the formulas of this formal language 
in such a way that the language could in effect talk about itself. 
This procedure has since been called Godel numbering in his honor. 
He needed a rule or function assigning to each formula of number 
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theory (abbreviated N) and to each finite sequence of formulas a 
natural number. The reader can easily convince himself that this 
is plausible, since there are a countable number of symbols, 
and a countable number of formulas, and also a countable number 
of finite sequences of formulas. Finite sequences of formulas 
are important since a proof will be defined as such a sequence 
satisfying certain properties. This Godel numbering function 
(let us call it g) must satisfy the following two properties: 
1. g must be 1 - 1 
2. g must be "computable," i.e., for any formula or sequence 
of formulas we could effectively compute its Godel 
number, and for each natural number we could effectively 
compute the formula (if any) associated with it. 
How can we construct this mapping? Let us first define g 
on the symbols of N, (which are listed in Table I) : 
g [ ( J = 3 g[=] = 13 g[+] = 23 
g [) J = 5 g[l;l] = 15 g [. J = 25 
g [' J = 7 g [3 J = 17 g[e] = 27. 
g['l] = 9 g[<.] = 19 g [x. ] = 29+4i l 
g[v] = 11 g [S J = 21 g [c. ] = 31+4i i = 0' 1' .•. l 
In this manner every symbol has a natural number associated 
to it in a 1-1 way. 
Assign to every finite string of symbols CJ1 .•. ern (and 
n 
thus to every formula) the natural number IT P. g (O""i) where P. 
j=l J J 
.th is the J prime number. Therefore, g ( v 1 ..• IJ"n) = 
g is 1-1 on the strings, by the unique factorization of natural 
numbers. 
Now assign to each sequence of strings s1 . • • Sn the 
number 
n 
'Tf 
j=l 
p g (S.) 
j J g in the same manner as above. g is still 
1-1 on the strings and sequenc.es of strings. (Notice that no 
string of symbols has the Godel number as any sequence of strings). 
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Finally, note that g is "computable" in the sense described above. 
Ex. 2: g[+(x0 ,S(x1 )) = S(+(x0 ,x1 ))] 
translation: x
0 
+ S(x1 ) = S(x0 + x 1 ) 
whew~ 
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IV. SOME PROOF TrillORY 
At the intuitive level the question "what is a proof?" is 
not trivial and borders on the philosophical. However, vle can 
formulate a formal >vorking definition which corresponds nicely to 
our intuition. A proof, in mathematics as in any other logical 
discipline, must start somehwere. There is a basic set of 
axioms, from which other statements are proved. Once the place 
to start or axiom set is given, one must know the method of moving 
from one statement to the next, i.e., the rules of infe.rence. 
Let us prescribe these concepts more precisely in our system of 
axiomatic number theory. 
First, the axioms. The axioms of N, also known as 
Peano's Postulates, are the following formulas: 
l. I(Sx =C) [O is not the successor of any natural number] 0 0 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
( (Sx
0 
= Sx1)~ (x0 = x1 )) [the successer function is 1-l] 
(+ (x ,C ) = x ) [0 is identity for addition] 
0 0 0 
(+(x
0
,Sx1 )·= S(+(x0 ,x1 )))[inductive definition of addition] 
( · (x , C ) = C ) [0 times any natural number is 0] 
0 0 0 
(· (xo,Sxl) = +(• (xofl) ,xo)) [inductive definition of 
multiplication] 
7. 
B. 
9. 
I (x ( C ) [no natural number is less 0] 
0 0 
((x
0
C.Sx1 ) 0 ((x0 <x1 ) v (x0 =x1 ))) 
((A(C
0
)&(Vx
0
) (A(x
0
) ----=7 A(Sx
0
))) ----t- (\ix1 ) (A(x1 ))) 
[induction axiom for any formula A] 
These axioms are, of course, additions to the purely logical 
axioms of first-order logic, an example of which is the logical 
equality axiom: 
where 'f is any statement with one free variable. Among. the 
logical rules of inference are the following: 
Rl): Generalization- from A(x
0
) 
infer ('</x
0
) (A (x
0
)) 
R2): Specification from ( \1' x
0
) (A (x
0
)) 
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infer A (t) where t is any term of L. 
R3): Modus Ponens from A, A~ B 
infer B. 
With the above defined, we can now give an explicit 
definition of a proof. 
Def: A proof sequence from assumptions q(a set of formulas of N) 
i.s a finite sequence of formulas o< 1 , • • , o<.n, satisfying the 
fdllowing: Each o{ . , i=l,. 
J.. 
, n, is either 
l. an axiom, 
2. a rormula in ({ (an assumption), or 
3. derivable £rom (o< 1 , ..• ·, c<i_1 } by one of the rules 
of inference. 
This is quite a natural definition, and leads also to 
the following: 
Def: A formula A is a theorem from assumptions ({_ if it is 
the last formula of a proof sequence from assumptions « . we 
write «_!-A. 
Thus a theorem is any formula which is "provable," in 
the sense described above. Let us denote our set of axioms by 
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P (for Pea no 1 s Postulates).. Thus if A is a theorem of axiomatic 
.number theory, we 'lvrite P f- A. 
An important Meta-theorem in Proof Theory is the Deduction 
Theorem. It is stated belmv: 
The Deduction Theorem From QV(A} f- B one may infer C(l- (A·-7> B), 
and from C( 1- (A-7B) one can infer (( V(A} 1- B. 
The proof of the deduction theorem is not difficult, but 
it will not be given here. For a proof in the general first-order 
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case, see Schoenfield, p. 33. This metatheorem is quite powerful 
as a derived rule of inference, as will be s.een shortly. 
V. SO!'lE DEFINITIONS 
In order to accurately state Godel 1 s. theorem, we shall need 
a few definitions. 
Def A set of formulas ~ is inconsistent if there exists a 
formula A of N s. t •. L r A and I: I- I A. 
Def L" is consistent otherwise. Def 2:_ is w-inconsistent if there 
exists a formula ~(x0 ) (i.e., with an unquantified variable}s.t . 
for all i = o, 1, • • • , but I" [-( ('r/x) (\O(x )). 
. o T o 
'2: is ,,_consistent otherwise.N.otice that if ~is incon-
sistent then ~is w-inconsistent, by the specification rule. 
Hence if 2:, is w-consistent then L_ is consistent. 
Def: ~ is incomplete if there exists a formula ~·of N s.t. 
neither ~'? nor its negation is provable from L. In symbols, 
~ is incomplete if there exists a formula tp if N s. t. not 
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VI. STATEHENT OF THE THEOREM 
lile now have at hand all of the facts n.ecessary to formulate 
Godel's theorem. 
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem If P is w-consistent, then P 
is incomplete. 
\1e would e:xpect a reasonable formulation. of axiomatic number 
theory to be w-consistent. w-inconsistency is a somewhat para-
doxical property. Therefore Godel 1 s theorem can be restated 
informally as follows. If Peano's Postulates satisfy certain 
quite natural conditions, there are statements expressible in our 
language which can neither be proved nor disproved. We shall now 
present the proof of Godel"' s theorem. 
VII. THE KEY LEJ'fil'JA 
Before stating the key lemma needed in the proof, we shall 
require some new terminology, incorporated in the following 
definitions.· 
Def: Define a relation Sub(x,y,z) on the natural numbers to be 
true if and only if x is the Godel number of a formula A with 
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one free variable and z is the Godel number of the formula 
obtained from A by replacing every occurrence of the free 
vaiiable in A· by the constant c • y For example, sub(2
29
,o,2 31 ) 
is true. (A = 11 x 11 and the transformed statement is 11 c 11 ) 0 J 0 • 
Sub is thus a substitution relation. Define Pr(L,n) to be true 
if and only if the formula with Godel number n is the last 
line of a proof sequence which has Godel number L. 
The key Lemma can now be stated: 
Lemma l There exists formulas in our formal language denoted 
by sub (xl'x2 ,x3) and pr(x1 ,x2 ), such that: 
if Sub (n, i,m) is true, the·n P f- sub (c ,c.,c) and n 1 m 
if Sub (n,i,m) is false, then P f- I SUb (c,c.,c) and n 1 m 
if. Pr (L,n) is true, then P 1- pr (cl,cn) .and 
if Pr(L,n) is false, p 1- I pr (c.,c ). 1 n 
This lemma, sometimes referred to as the expressibility Lemma, is 
very powerful. It essentially translates statements about sub-
s·ti tution and proof to statements about natural numbers; this 
link-up is the primary application of Godel numbering and is 
difficult to prove --the proof will not be given here. However, 
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the fact that this Lemma is true is not unreasonable, since our 
Godel function g was "computable," and the notion of proof is 
finitary. Hence given any two natural numbers N, m we can 
"decode" both into the strings of symbols they represent and 
actually determine in a finite number of steps whether or not 
the two strings·satisfied the required properties. Since we can 
carry out this procedure, it also becomes possible to "prove" 
formally the statements whose existence the Lemma guarantees. A 
formalization of this procedure is in fact what is used in the 
proof of Lemma 1. Its function in the proof of the main theorem 
will become clear shortly. 
There is another lemma which will be needed in the proof. 
It is more intuitive than the expressibility lemmas and we shall 
also omit its proof. 
Lemma 2 P r- sub(c ,c ,x1)~ (sub(c ,c ,x2 )-1 x 1 ~ x 2 ) for all n. n .n n n 
This lemma expresses the 1-lness of the sub formula, and will 
also be needed below. 
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VIII. THE I,1AIN THEOREM 
Let f be any formula of N with one free variable, x 2 , 
n be the Godel number of An. · Let Am be the formula 
Am. Note: Notice that Sub(n,n,rn) is true. The main theorem is then: 
Theorem 1 
PROOF: 
A 
rn 
1. P, lfl (ern), sub(cn,cn,x2 ) 1- sub(cn,cn,crn)--7 (SUb(cn,cn,x 2 ) ~ (x 2=crn)) 
by Lemma 2. 
2. P, '{)(ern), sub(cn,cn,x2 ) j-- sub (cn,cn,crn) 
by ~ and expressibility 
3. p, LfJ (ern), SUb (cn,cn,x2 ) 1- sub (cn,cn,x2 )·~ x 2 = ern 
1),2), ahd modus ponens 
4. P, '])(ern)' sub (cn,cn,x2 ) 1- sub (cn,cn,x2 ) 
; an assumption 
c 
rn 
3),4), and modus ponens 
6. p, lf (c ) f- sub (c , c , x 2 ) -7 x 2 = ern . rn n n 
5), deduction theorem 
7. P, tf/ (ern) ,sub(cn,cn,x2 ) 1- x 2 = crn--7 ( lfl(crn) <__:.7'f(x 2 )) 
~ a logical axiom of equality 
8, P, 4J (em), sub(en,cn,x2 ) f- ~ (cm)H 'P (x2 ) 
6),7) modus ponens 
9, P, 1.{>· (em), ffilb(cn,cn,x 2 ) 1- 'f (em) 
an assumption 
10. P, if! (em), sub(cn,en,x2 ) j- 'f (x2 ) 
8) , 9) ·' and modus ponens · 
ll. P, i{J (em) j- sub(en,en,x2)~ 'f (x2 ) 
by 10), deduction theorem 
12. P, If! (em) j-('vx2 ) (sub (en,cn,x2 ) ·.-:t '{J (x2 )) 
11), generalization rule 
12) , by defini·tion of Am 
A 
m 
13), and deduction theorem 
The other direction is slightly shorter: 
1. ( {::::- ) p, sub ( e , e , x 2 ) ----::;. \ n (x2 ) 1- sub ( c , e , c ) -)' 1.1J ( c ) n n · T n n m T m 
Rule of specialization 
2. P, sub (cn,cn,x2 )-7' 'f (x2 ) 1- sub (cn,en,cm) 
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by note and expressibility Lemma 
3, P, sub (en,cn,x2 )~ 1 (x2 ) j- 'f (em) 
1 ,2),·modus ponens 
4. p j- (sub (cn,en,x2 l--1 lf (x2 )) ~ ~e (em) 
3), deduction theorem 
generalization rule 
QED 
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IX. GODEL 1 S THEOREM 
Godel's Theorem which we restate now is a corollary to Theorem 1. 
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem If P is w-consistent, then P 
is incomplete. 
The proof is constructive in that we exhibit the required 
statement \jl s. t. not P f-l{l and not P f-1 I{J. 
PROOF: Assume P is w-consistent. Define ~ (x2 ) of theorem 1 
there is no proof for the formula of N with Godel number x 2 • 
Let An' Am be as in Theorem 1. 
Case I: Assume Then we can prove A 
m 
from Peano's 
Postulates and thus, there exists a proof sequence for Am. Let 
L be the Godel number of this proof sequence. Since m is the 
Godel number of A , Pr(L,m) is true. Therefore, by the expressibility 
m 
Therefore, by modus ponens, P 1-- (vx 3) (I pr (x 3 ,cm)). Consequently, 
P f- 1 pr(~,cm) by rule of specialization. This contradicts the 
consistency of P. Therefore, our assumption that P f- Am is 
intennable. 
Case II: Assume P 1- I Am 
by Theorem 1 
1), law of contrapositives 
assumption, 2),modus ponens 
4. P ~ 1 (Vx 3)-,pr(x3'cm) 
3), Definition of l.fJ (em) 
5. p r (:3x3) pr (x3,cm) 
4), Algebra of quantifiers. 
6. But we know not P j- Am. 
Therefore Pr(L,m) is false for every L. 
by expressibility Lemma. 
Thus, since P is w-consistent, we must have not: 
or, not 
Therefore, \ve have not P j- 1 ·Am. 
VIe have shown that A is neither provable nor disprovable 
m 
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from Peano 1 s Postulates. Thus if P is w-consistent, there are 
formulas which can neither be proved nor disproved. P is there-
fore incomplete and Godel' s theorem is established. 
The reader may wonder whether Pea no 1 s · Postulates are .a 
cruaial factor in this proof, and whether other axioms for natural 
number theory can be found which somehow circumvent the process 
described above. The answer is NO. It follows from Godel's 
proof that any axiom system which is of sufficient power to capture 
the elementary notions of addition, multiplication, and order in 
the natural numbers will be incomplete. 
X. ATTEMPTS AT CONSISTENCY PROOFS 
As another corollary to Theorem 1, we obtain the following 
interesting result, due to Tarski: 
Theorem One cannot prove the consistency of Peano's Postulates within 
the framework of axiomatic number theory. 
PROOF: Define a relation Neg(i,j) on the natural numbers by 
Neg(i,j) is true if and only if i is the Godel number of a 
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formula A and j is the Godel number of 1 A. As one might suspect, 
there is also-an expressibility lemma associated to Neg, i.e., there 
exists a formula of N, say ~ (x1 ,x2 ), s.t. if Neg(i,j) is 
true, then P f- neg (c.,c.); and if Neg (i,j) is false, then 
1 J . . 
p r I neg (ci, cj) • Let c be the formula expressing consistency, 
in terms of pr and Neg: 
then 
Let 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. but 
be as in Godel's Theorem, i.e., 
definition of A , Theorem l. · 
m 
P, I'{) (c ) f-1 lfl (c )--?-1 A 
m m m 
1), law of contrapositives 
P, I l{J (c ) f-1 1 0 (c ) m l- m 
assumption 
2),3), modus ponens 
P,jlf (em) rAm 
by definition of I lf (em). 
Then 
Let m' be the Godel number of lA. 
m 
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6. P, I 'f(cm) 1- Gx1 ) (::Jx2 ) (pr(xl'crn),&pr(x2 ,cm')&Neg(crn,cm')) 
4),5), and by expressibility of pr, neg 
7. P, I 'fl (em) l-1 C 
6), definition of C. 
8. P f-l<fl (c)~-, C 1 ITt 
7), deduction theorem 
No\•7 assume P f- C 
8), law of contrapositives 
8), 9L modus ponens 
11. P 1- f (c ) -7 A ra n 
Theorem 1 
12. P f- Am 
10), 11), modus ponens 
This is a contradiction to Godel's Theorem --we have 
just shown A 
m 
is unprovable. Thus not P 1- c. 
Thus we have shown that we cannot prove C .from 
Peano's Postulates, and the theorem is established. The reader may 
wonder whether this particular formula expressing consistency is 
crucial to the proof; the answer here is NO. Given any formula 
• 
A which'represents" consistency in any·reasonable sense, we would 
be able to prove that P 1- A ~ C; Hence if A tvere provable, so 
would C be --but we have seen above that C is not. 
XI. OTHER EXPOSITORY AND HISTORICAL REMARKS 
Consider the English sentence "I am not provable." Let us 
suppose informally that there exists sonie notion of proof and 
provability in English. Then >ve would of course insist that 
whatever one "proved" would be true. If one could then prove the 
above sen·tence, it would be true, and hence one would not be 
able to prove it -- a clear contradiction. This, then, is an 
example of a sen·tence in English which cannot be proved. (Notice 
then that it is a true sentence). Godel's numbering system took 
this statement, a "meta-statement" in that it does not belong to 
the formal language L, and expressed it i·n the formal language, 
in this way using ·the language to speak about itself. The reader 
may find it quite helpful to refer to this English conterpart when 
attempting to understand more fully the nature of the Incompleteness 
23 
Theorem. 
In 1936 Barkley Rosser strengthened Godel 1 s theorem by 
weakening the hypothesis from w-consistency to. consistency. He 
proved the following: 
Theorem If P is consistent, then P is incomplete. 
The proof of the above theorem is more technical but uses the 
same fundamental principles as that of the theorem proved in this 
paper. 
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'1. 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether or not the Continuum Hypothesis can be 
proved from the other axioms of axiomatic set theory has been an open 
question for many years. Rec-ently, the problem has been solved by Cohen 
and simpler arguments presented by Scott, Solovay, and others. We 
intend here to discuss the nature of independence proofs and to briefly 
describe the boolean valued logic used to obtain the independence 
results. 
A. General Axiomatics 
The peculiar feature of mathematics as a science is its deductive 
nature: while other science.s rely most heavily on observation for the 
justification and verification of their results, mathematicians 
demand proof. Yet no mathematician would argue that mindless 
cranking-out of "theorems" without any regard for their meaning 
or importance is a part of ma·thematics. They, too, are concerned 
with a "real" world -- the world of ideas, intuition, and relationships 
between concepts. This serves to motivate two aspects of the proof 
process: the decisions of what to try to prove and on what to base 
2. 
the proof. \ The latter is the subject of the immediate discussion. 
The choice of axioms is a central and illuminationg facet of all 
of modern·mathematics. 
Axiomatic theories are formally all of the same mold; they 
have a set of axioms which refer to some (possibly unspecified} 
"universe of discourse", and rules of inference for deriving other 
statements from the axioms. But in motivation, axiomatic theories 
break into two classes. Let us refer to them as "pure" and "approximate" 
theories --the reason will soon be clear. As an example of the 
first type let me cite abstract group theory. A group is a set G 
with a binary operation+ satisfying the following axioms: 
1. F.or all a and b in G, a+b is in G. 
2. For all a, b, and c in G, (a+b)+c = a+ (b+c). 
3 •. There exists an element e in G such that a+e = e+a = a 
for all a in G. 
4. For every a in G there exists an element b in G such that 
a+b = e. 
These axioms describe groups completely. By the Completeness 
Theorem for first-order logic, any statement that is true in every 
group is provable from these axioms. One might say then that the 
3. 
abstract study of groups is identical with the study of these axioms 
and what can or cannot be proved from them •. In this sense then 
the axiomatic theory is pure. These axioms are not designed to 
describe groups, but groups are defined as. any object satisfying 
these axioms. 
In contrast to this type of theory is that best represented by 
axiomatic number theory. The intuitive notion of natural numbers 
is not conceived as a set of axioms which describe them, but as an 
entity which in some 111ays defies description. In order to capture the 
concept and axiomatize it, one chooses properties of the natural 
numbers which are intuitively obvious and takes these as axioms. 
Hopefully these axioms will describe numbers completely in the sense 
that any true statement about natural numbers is provable from 
them. The axioms most commonly chosen are called Peano's Postulates 
and refer to a universe N with one unary function symbol s. 
1. There exists a distinguished element 0 of N. 
2. If nisin N, then S(n) is inN. 
3. There does not exist ann inN such that S(n) = 0. 
4.IfS(n) ' . = S(m) form and n 1n N, then m = n. 
5. If A is a subset of N containing 0 and closed under S, 
then A = N. 
Interpreting the function S as the successor function, these 
axioms are seen to be obiously true in the intuitive natural 
numbers, But we cannot be sure that all true statements about the 
natural numbers are provable from them --in fact, G~del's 
Incompleteness Theorem states that they cannot. These axioms then 
do not capture the concept of natural number entirely -- they are 
only "approximate", and in this sense are distinctly different 
from the axioms for group theory. 
A similar process is carried out in Euclidean geometry. 
Euclid, the first proponent of the axiomatic method, tried to 
describe the intuitive notion of plane geometry by means of five 
axioms which he felt were self-evident. He was not interested in 
describing all "geometries" which satisfy certain postulates, but 
only geometry in the plane. One can see that the motivation for 
the axiomatization is the same as that for number theory. 
4. 
5. 
B. What .is Independence? 
The most desirable situation in any axiomatic theory would 
be to have as simple an axiom set as possible without altering 
the body of theorems which are derivable. What is self-evident to 
one may· seem incomprehensible to another; therefore., in keeping 
the list of axioms simple one would lessen the probability of 
disagreement and in general simplify the entire subject. Hence the 
search for a minimal axiom set is of some importance. 
If a statement is neither provable nor disprovable from a given 
~xiom set, it is said to be independent. For example, in group 
theory the statement 
5. For all a and b in G, a+b = b+a 
is independent of the four axioms given above. One way to prove 
that a statement is not provable from a set of axioms ( this is not 
a contradiction! ) is ·to exhibit a structure in which the axioms 
are true but the given statement is not. ( Since the proof process 
preserves truth, if the statement were provable then it would have 
to be true in that structure also.) The existence of non-commutative 
6. 
groups ( and commutative ones) proves that the above statement 
is independent. In the pure type of axiomatic theory this is not 
so interes.ting: one simply obtains another theory, the theory of 
abelian groups in this case. In the approximate type, however, the 
addition of a new independent axiom may. not simply change the subject, 
but may allow one ·to prove new theorems· about. the same subject. 
Euclid, in formulating his postulates for plane geometry, 
found that he needed the parallel postulate to prove many theorems 
which he felt \vere true. This postulate, which states that there is 
one and only one line through a given point parallel to a given line, 
was felt to lack the attribute of being "self-evident" which his 
other postulates had, and for over 2000 years mathematicians 
attempted to prove it from the other postulates~ None succeeded. 
It was not until the nineteenth century that people began to vmnder 
\vhether it v1as provable at. all from these other postulates; the 
denial of this axiom led to non-Euclidean geometries which were 
distinctly differen·t, yet not inconsistent. 
How could one prove that the parallel postulate was not 
7 . 
provable? One such proof which is especially relevant to the discussion 
is that given by Young, and it proceeds as follows. We start with 
the Euclidean plane. This disarms all who wish to deny the existence 
of "non-Euclidean" geometry. We take as "points" the points of the 
plane i'nterior to the unit circle, and take as "lines" chords of 
the circle. !"!any postulates hold immediately' for instance' that 
through bvo distinct "points" there passes one and only one "line". 
However, defining "parallel'' as non-intersecting, we see that the 
parallel postulate fails. It is possible to definE) "distance" 
in such a way as to validate all the other postulates except this 
one; this makes it conclusive that it cannot·be derived from the 
others. 
No'te that in the sketch above we assumed a Euclidean plane to 
start with·, i. e. , assumed the parallel postulate. In the. proof 
of the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis (CH} in set theory 
we also assume the CH, and then modify the notion of "set", "well-
ordering", "cardinal number", etc. In fact, pmverful principles 
like the axiom of choice and the CH are needed to prove that the 
8. 
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unorthodox sets have the desired properties. Before getting ahead 
of ourselves, however, let us acquire the proper framework for the 
discussion. 
II. AXIOl'!ATIC SET THEORY 
A; Foundations 
Set theory is another example of an "approximate" axiomatic 
theory. Intuitive set theory was simply too imprecise for the 
mathematicians of the twentieth century. Paradoxes were emerging 
for 'vhich there seemed no solution. The ultimate result of this 
problem was a complete overhaul of the foundations of set theory 
and many attempts at axiomatization. The most common and widely 
accepted of these is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the axioms of 
which are reproduced here. 
1. The Axiom of Extensionality: If two sets A and B have the 
same elements, then they are the s.ame set. 
2 •. The Null Set Axiom: There exists a set ¢which contains 
no other set. 
3. The Sum Axiom: For any two sets A and B, there exists a set 
C containing all and only the members of A and B. 
4. The Pmver Set Axiom: Given any set A there exists a set 
B such that B contains as members all and only the subsets of A. 
9. 
5. The Axiom of Regularity: Every non-empty set A contains an 
element X such that X and A are disjoint. 
6. The Axiom of Infinity: There exists a set A containing the 
empty set such that whenever B is an element of A, the set 
B(J(B} is an element of A. 
?. ~Axiom of ReJ2lacement: The range of any function is a set. 
All of the above axioms can be formulated in a first-order 
language with one binary relation E , denoting set membership. 
For instance, the axiom of extensionality can be written as 
The reader may be interested in formulating the other axioms similarly. 
In this paper .the symbolic form will have to be resorted to in 
certain cases. 
How intuitive and self-evident are these axioms? It is generally 
accepted that they are quite satisfactory in this respect, and in 
nearly every form of axiomatic set theory these statements appear as 
either axioms or theorems. The following axiom, over which there has 
been much controversy, does not share this property~ 
8. The Axiom of Choice: Given any set A there exists a function 
f from .the set of subsets of A to A such that f(x)E x for 
every subset x of A. 
lO. 
The primary objection to this axiom is that it is not constructive; 
the choice function f is not explicitly.given --only its existence 
is assured. This objection is quite valid and can only be refuted 
by refering to the power of this theorem -- without it, for example, 
one cannot prove that every set has a c·ardinal numbe.r. 
B. Cardinal Number Theory 
Two sets A and B are equipollent if there exists a one-to-one, 
onto function f from A to B. Equipollence is an equivalence relation 
and intuitively classifies sets as to their size; for example, 
two finite sets are equipollent if and only if they have the same 
number of elements. Cardinal Numbers are special sets which are meant 
to represent equipollence classes in the follm~ing way: two sets 
have the same cardinal number associated to them if and only if 
they are equipollent. To construct these special sets is no easy 
mat·ter and it shall not be attempted here. However, it is a con-
sequence of the axiom of choice that one can construct a cardinal 
number for every set such that the above property holds. It is also 
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' a theorem that any set of cardinal numbers is well-ordered in a 
natural way. 
The finite cardinals are isomorphic to the set of natural numbers. 
Hence their properties are well-kno>vn. The first infinite cardinal, 
I 
denoted -;\..0 , is the cardinal number of. the set of integer·s (and 
of every countable set). All infinite cardinals are denoted by these 
alephs, and they are such that 'X 1 is the next cardinal number after 
.,t 
1'-0 , and so forth. Being "the next cardinal number" means that 
I 
there is no set whose cardinality is greater than "7\.- 0 but less that 
I 
/( 1 • This is by definition of the alephs, and in fact is their main 
property. 
Cantor, the man who founded modern cardinal number theory and 
in so doing revolutionized a good part of mathematics, proved the 
following theorem: 
Cantor's Theorem If A is a set, then the set of all subsets of A, 
denoted ')A , has Cardinality strictly greater than that of A. 
0\.. 
I 
i 
This theorem, applied to the set 'A-o , states f.-o ~ that :[ > , o 
I · I 
Since "X- 1 is the next infinite cardinal after "/-- 0 , "\ve must then have 
12. 
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It can be shown that while ):-0 is the cardinality 
I 
";\-o 
of the integers, 1 is the cardinality.of the continuum. The 
~ I q 1 o_ \:_ 
Continuum Hypothesis is that oL - 1 1 , i.e., that there is no 
set of real numbers -vli th cardinality strictly greater than that of the 
integers, but strictly less than that of the continuum. This 
fascinating conjecture was the object of many attempts at proof, 
but none succeeded. Yet neither could anyone find an appropriate 
set of real numbers to disprove it. The proof that it was independent 
of the axioms for set theory (even including the powerful axiom of 
choice} was a startling and dramatic result, in all ways analogous 
to the corresponding discovery concerning Euclid's infamous parallel 
postulate. 
III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL 
A. Boolean Preliminaries 
We shall proceed shortly to a definition of a universe V of 
objects, which will correspond to the "sets" of our theory. 
Simultaneously with the definition of V will be given a definition 
of the predicates € and = , in the following way: for each pair 
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of objects a and b of V we associate bvo elements P and Q of a 
given Boolean algebra, which elements are to be associated with 
the statements aEb and a=b, respectively. These shall be called the 
"Boolean values" of aEb and a=b, and will be denoted II aEb II and 
II a=b I J', respectively. 
With the Boolean values of the atomic formulas of the language 
so defined, the Boolean values for other statements without free 
variables can be given as follows: 
I 
1/lX/1 = 1/X/1 
I I x&Y I I = I I x I II\ I I Y I I · 
If F (x) is a statement containing no free occurrences of any v'ariable 
except x, then II (\;lxJF(xJ II = 1\ /IE (a) 1/. 
<l-£-V 
Me choose the Boolean 
algebra to be complete, thereby assuring the existence of the above 
infimum). Then: 
1/XVY/1 = 1/X//V 1/Y/1 
I 
llx-hll = llxiJ.V IIYII 
II (3 x)F (x) II = V IIF {a) II 
a.~v 
If X contains free variables x 1 , •..• ,xn , and no matter how these 
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are replaced by members of V the resulting statement without 
free variables has Boolean Value l, we then set J JxJ J = l. 
The procedure in proving that some specific statement. X
0 
is 
not derivable in set theory is to establish two results: 
(1) Every statement derivable in set theory has Boolean value 1. 
(2Y The statement X
0 
does not have Boolean value 1. 
Let us first outlinehow (l) is established. This is done 
by showing that if X is an axiom of set theory, then J JxJ J = 1, and 
if Z can be derived from X and Y by the rules of set theory, and 
1/X/1 = 1/Y/1 = l, then 1/z/1 = 1. 
B. The Logical Axioms and Rules 
Set theory can be formulated such that the only rule of inference 
is modu·s ponens. Thus the application of the rules of set theory is 
taken care of by the following theorem: 
Theorem If JJxJJ = 1 and J/X~Y// = 1 then //Y// = 1. 
The proof is essentially the following argument. If J/X~Y // = l 
/ I 
then JJxJJy //Y// = l. But JJxJJ = o, since //X// = l. Hence 
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II Y II = 1. In a similar manner all of the axioms of first-order 
logic can be shown to have Boolean value 1. For example, let us 
establish ·that the axiom .('Q'x)}" (x,b)-7F (b,b) has Boolean value 1. 
We must show that [II (\fx)F (x,b) II=/ IIF (b,b) Ill - 1, or equivalently, 
that[(\ IIF(a,blii=/IIF{b,b)lll = 1. This is if and only if 
~£.V . 
I\ ·I IF (a,b) II L IIF (b,b) II, which is obvious, ·since 1\ acts as an 
«€\! 
infimum operation with respect to the partial ordering 
It remains then to investigate the axioms of set theory and to 
show that they have Boolean value 1. We must define the universe V 
and the Boolean values of the atomic statements in order to do this, 
as one might expect. 
c. The construction of the Model 
Let us recall the proof of the independence of the parallel 
postulate. To invalidate the postulate, "points" and "lines" were 
introduced which differed slightly from the classical points and 
lines -- however, .as ·few changes as· possible were made, since the 
other postulates \·Jere· to remain valid. vle are at a similar point. 
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We shall need to modify the notion of "set" and "set membership", 
but only so much as to invalidate the Continuum Hypothesis, while 
keeping the other axioms valid. 
To every classical set A there· is associated a characteristic 
function fA such that fA(x) = 1 if x€A,· and fA(x) = 0 if x/A. 
Identifying 1 with truth and 0 with falsity, we might. say that the 
statement xEA takes the value fA (x). vVith this in mind the 
generalization to a Boolean valued logic·is evident. A "set" will 
be a function f whose values are elements of the given Boolean 
algebra. Thus the Boolean value of the statement a€f is f(a). 
llaEfll=f(a) 
Once this is defined, equality is not difficult to define. Since 
we have ·a=b if and only if ('t/ x) (x€a ~ xEb), define 
= 1\ lla(x)(...:)b(x) II 
MV 
It is not practicable to introduce all our 11 sets" at once. 
Thus, when we introduce a new "set". f, we can define f(a) for those 
a 1 s which have already been introduced. For other a 1 s, f (a) >vill 
17. 
' be left undefined. We can still define aE:f and g=f, however; this 
is done by setting 
jjaE:fjj = jj(~x)(a=x&xeflll 
and by restricti,ng the domain of the infimum operation 1\ in 
the definition of g=f to the domain of f and g. 
This paper is not the place to enter into the details of the 
construction of the model. The principle, however, should be clear: 
our "sets" will not' correspond to functions into (0,1}, but to 
functions into a given Boolean algebra. The modification is 
slight enough to.assure that the axioms of set theory have Boolean 
value 1, but is great enough to force the Continuum Hypothesis not 
to have value 1. 
D. The Key Result 
Let us assume that the Boolean algebra used in the construction 
satisfies· the count.able chain condition. This assures us of 
several necessary results, among which· is tha·t the 11 set" corresponding 
to the set of integers is well-behaved, and that "cardinality" 
inside the model is· the same as cardinality in classical set theory. 
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' Let then g be a function from the classical set of integers to 
the given Boolean algebra, If g is the constant function 1, 
then g corresponds to the set of integers itself. BUt if g is 
arbitrary, it then refers to a "subset" of the integers, just as. 
a function from the integers to (0,1}-defines a subset in the 
classical sense ((xI g (x) = 1} is the subset· in the classical case). 
How many such "subsets" of the integers exist? Clearly if the 
Boole.an algebra has a large number of elements, such subsets 
will be quite numerous -- numerous enough, in fact, to force 
I "2~", the 11 cardinality" of the set of all 11 subsets" of the integers, 
(all·refering to the Boolean valued model) to be strictly greater 
I . 
than ~I' thereby refuting the Continuum Hypothesis. 
The main question is this: can a Boolean algebra be found which 
is of large enough cardinality to obtain the above result while 
still satisfying the countable chain condition? The answer is yes, 
In fact, Boolean al·gebras with arbitrarily large cardinalities 
exist which satisfy the countable chain condition. 
Thus, with a· sui table choice of ·the Boolean algebra, we can 
19. 
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force the Continuum Hypothesis to have Boolean value 0. Also, 
since every axiom of set theory has Boolean value 1 and the rules 
of inference preserve Boolean value 1, every statement derivable in 
set theory has Boolean value 1. Thus, the Continuum Hypothesis 
is not derivable in se·t theory and hence is independent of the 
IV. FINAL REHARIZS 
The proof sketched above actually only shows that.the continuum 
Hypothesis is not provable from the axioms of set theory -- it 
does not show that it is not disprovable, or, in other words, that 
it is consistent. This was done, however, in the late 1930's by 
Kurt G"odel and his proof used methods which are quite different 
from those described in this paper. With his result, independence 
is established. 
Bool.ean valued logic can also be used to prove that the 
axiom of choice is independent of the other axioms for set theory. 
The relationship between these arguments and Cohen's original 
. . 
"forcing" techniques are subtle but can be d.iscovered. However, 
20. 
Boolean arguments seem to be of more general application than 
the forcing arguments used in the original proof. 
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